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ABSTRACT
John F. Kennedy initiated the Peace Corps in 1961 at the height of the Cold War
to provide needed manpower and promote understanding with the underdeveloped world.
This study examines Peace Corps work in Colombia during the 1960s within the
framework of U.S. Cold War policy. It explores the experiences of volunteers in
Colombia and contrasts their accounts with Peace Corps reports and presentations to
Congress. It intends to show the agency’s assessment of volunteer work and how it
compares to the volunteers’ views and Congressional reports.
Although the Peace Corps presented some topics and themes expressed by
volunteers, the thesis exposes the discrepancies that existed between Peace Corps reports
and the volunteers’ experiences. Volunteer accounts reveal that there were some
criticisms and stories that the agency did not report. Furthermore, evidence sheds light
on the obstacles volunteers encountered, how they were presented by the Peace Corps, as
well as the value of volunteer work as perceived by volunteers. Finally, the Peace Corps
articulated a goal of making friends in the underdeveloped world, and the accounts of the
volunteers support the Peace Corps assertion that volunteers were successful in fostering
relations and understanding in Colombia during the 1960s.
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INTRODUCTION
The Cold War struggle against communism dominated United States foreign
policy after World War II. There was an intense and real fear that unless the United
States acted to prevent the growth of communism, it would spread around the world until
it reached the shores of America and threatened the American way of life. During the ten
to fifteen years following the Second World War Latin America was not a significant part
of U.S. Cold War policy. There was a much greater focus on Europe, where the Marshall
Plan helped to rebuild the war-torn continent and contain the spread of communism.
Latin America, despite its close proximity to the United States, received little attention.
This is not to say that it was completely ignored, as illustrated by the U.S. backed coup in
1954 to overthrow Guatemala’s reformist government. However, it was not a major
concern and received little U.S. aid. From 1945 through 1952 Belgium and Luxembourg
received more U.S. money than all of Latin America. As one historian notes, Latin
America in the decade after World War II was “considered relatively secure from Soviet
invasion or subversion and, therefore, a low priority in U.S. global policy.”1
In the years immediately following World War II Latin America was a region in
transition. Pressures from below emerged for political, social, and economic change.
There was an emphasis on labor reform, income inequality, land reform, and an overall
expansion of freedoms. The Soviet Union at this time was expanding its influence in
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Europe and turning its attention to the Third World.2 It was not, however, the Soviets
who would cause a major shakeup in Latin America; it was Fidel Castro’s march into
Havana in January 1959.
The Cuban Revolution and Castro’s subsequent shunning of the United States and
turn to the Soviet Union had a profound impact on Latin American politics and U.S.
foreign policy. But during the initial years of Castro’s reign, there was uncertainty as to
future relations between the two countries. The course of the revolution struck fear into
Washington, as it watched the regime execute batistianos, implement agrarian reform,
tolerate Communists, and call for revolution throughout Latin America. There was also
the unwanted possibility of Cuba taking a neutral position in the Cold War. Relations
were tenuous within the first few months of the Cuban rebels’ victory.
Castro and President Eisenhower did not see eye to eye and share the same vision
for Cuba. When Castro visited the United States in April 1959, Eisenhower decided to
go golfing in Georgia. Before the year was over, the Eisenhower administration had
decided to work with anti-Castro groups within Cuba to “check” or “replace” the regime.
By March of 1960 the CIA was working with Cuban exiles to invade the island. Castro,
for his part, did not want to appear to be selling Cuba out to the imperialists. Thus, for
those first two years, “Havana and Washington traded punch for punch.”3 The stage was
set for further competition between the two to demonstrate which nation had the best
economic and social system to export across the region.
Meanwhile, empowered by Castro’s victory, many Latin Americans felt the time
had come to initiate change, and the Cuban Revolution provided the model. Politics in
2
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nearly every country in the region became more intense and radicalized; this at a time
when Latin America had more elected governments than any previous moment in its
history. The problem, however, was the lack of a strong tradition of democratic
processes. Except for a few countries, Latin America had little experience with civilian
government. Coups and military governments were the norm, not the exception, and as a
result the civilian governments in “most countries had shallow roots and thus were ill
prepared to withstand the tempest unleashed by the Cuban Revolution.”4
The impact of Castro’s revolution and his calls for and attempts at exporting
revolution resonated through the region during the 1960s. The political awakening and
increase in demands for reform strained many Latin American governments, often
leading to preemptive coups of civilian governments that appeared to be too friendly or
overly sympathetic to fidelista forces.5 A conservative civilian government in Peru was
deposed by a military coup in 1962, and in Colombia, which had already been
experiencing years of violence and conflict, fidelismo intensified the ongoing struggle.
The president of Ecuador was overthrown in 1963 after turmoil attributed to the
formation of Castroite groups and guerrilla outbreaks. In the same year the Guatemalan
president–a right-wing General–was overthrown by even more conservative military
officers. Honduras and the Dominican Republic would also succumb to military coups in
1963.
Another consequence of the Cuban Revolution was the rise of guerrilla groups.
Castro and Che Guevara openly espoused revolution and the breaking of the imperialistic
chains of the United States. Castro’s overthrow of the political order through violent
4
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means inspired others to take up arms, believing guerrilla war was the path to a new
social, political and economic system. The years after Castro’s victory witnessed
outbreaks of guerrilla warfare that were most often characterized by poor planning and
naiveté. Most soon fizzled when the harsh realities of conducting a guerrilla war set in.
However, by the mid 1960s several countries had serious guerrilla movements with
which to contend. Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia and Peru all required concerted
efforts on the part of their governments to quell these movements. In Colombia, two of
these groups are still active today.
In the latter part of the 1960s some revolutionaries, after seeing Che’s failed
attempt in Bolivia in 1967, decided to take their war to the cities. Seen by historians as a
continuation of the Cuban influence, urban guerrilla warfare posed major problems for
Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina. These movements proved more threatening to the
established order than their earlier rural counterparts. It was the lack of these guerrilla
movements in the decade after World War II that factored in the United States paying
little attention to the region. Latin America as a U.S. priority, however, shifted as the
Cuban Revolution demonstrated that armed revolt was a way to bring about a new social
and economic order in Latin America. This was precisely what the United States wished
to avoid: a tumultuous, unstable Latin America, susceptible to revolutionary movements
and communist influence.
U.S. Foreign Policy in Latin America: Eisenhower through Johnson
After World War II the main concern of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America was
stability and maintaining Latin American support in the global struggle against
communism. Latin America was not a top priority for the Soviets either, receiving only 6
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percent of Soviet aid for the noncommunist developing world6–although this would
change–and the United States acted accordingly, using its resources where they were
most needed, in Europe and Asia. In addition, democracy in Latin America was of little
concern to Washington. Dictators were accepted and sometimes courted, as long as they
provided stability and supported the U.S. anticommunist agenda. The Eisenhower
administration even awarded Perez Jimenez of Venezuela and Manuel Odria of Peru, two
of the most ruthless dictators in Latin America, with the U.S. Legion of Merit in 1954.7
During the 1950s dictators ruled as many as thirteen of twenty Latin American nations.
Yet some U.S. policymakers and Latin Americans felt the United States needed a
different approach in dealing with the region. A prime example of this is illustrated in
the disparate views of the U.S. backed overthrow of the Guatemalan government in 1954.
Whereas Washington viewed the toppling of the Arbenz government as a great success, it
provoked outrage and condemnation in Latin America. Vice President Nixon’s trip
through South America in 1958 opened a few eyes in Washington and forced some to
reassess U.S. policy in the region. Nixon had his car blocked and pelted with rocks in
Lima, and in Caracas, he was attacked by angry students and workers.8 Some in
Washington were shocked at the outpouring of anger and resentment directed at the
United States,9 but many shrugged it off as a communist conspiracy without recognizing
the root of the problem.10
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Eisenhower sent his brother Milton Eisenhower on several fact finding trips to
Latin America between 1954 and 1958, and he came to the conclusion that democracy
and development were linked, that the lack of the two posed a threat to U.S. national
security. The thinking was that unpopular dictators had more potential for instability and
popular uprisings. So the Eisenhower administration began to reassess its approach to its
southern neighbors.11
In response to an appeal by the presidents of Colombia and Brazil for the United
States to act against underdevelopment and impoverishment, a memorandum titled
“Operation Pan America” called for a program of public aid to help alleviate the
conditions of underdevelopment and instability.12 In 1959 the Inter-American
Development Bank was created to facilitate economic and social development,13 and the
United States then committed money by starting the Social Progress Trust Fund. These
efforts did not, however, put Latin America at the center of U.S. foreign policy. It was
John F. Kennedy who made it a top priority and focal point in the fight against
communism. In contrast to Eisenhower, who relied more on private investment and
friendly dictators to quell the spread of communism, Kennedy now looked to the United
States to promote economic development and political and social reform to thwart the
communists.14
The Kennedy administration believed the best way to contain communism in
Latin America was by improving the economic situation and furthering social justice.
Thus, in March 1961, Kennedy proposed the Alliance for Progress, which was to provide
11
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20 billion dollars over ten years15 “to create a joint working relationship with the Latin
Americans to meet their development problems and bring badly needed change to their
societies.” As President Kennedy said, “Unless necessary social reforms, including land
and tax reforms, are freely made–unless we broaden the opportunity of all our people–
unless the great mass of Americans share in increasing prosperity–then our alliance, our
revolution and our dream will have failed.”16
One of the architects of Kennedy’s foreign policy, Walt Whitman Rostow, a NSC
staff member and later the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council at State, also saw the
developing world as the new cold war battleground. Rostow felt the Communists
believed “that the techniques of political centralization under dictatorial control–and the
projected image of Soviet and Chinese Communist economic progress–will persuade
hesitant men, faced by great transitional problems, that the Communist model should be
adopted for modernization, even at the cost of surrendering human liberty.” It was up to
the United States to demonstrate that economic progress was possible under a democratic
model and to offer an alternative to communism. Rostow believed “the emerging less
developed nations must be persuaded that their human and national aspirations will be
better fulfilled within the compass of [the free] community than without.”17
Under the same banner as the Alliance but not solely aimed at Latin America,
Kennedy created the Peace Corps in 1961 as part of the broader program for socioeconomic and political reform in developing countries. Reflecting on the Peace Corps
twenty-five years after its inception, Sargent Shriver, its first director, said the Peace
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Corps was based on the premise that the power of ideas could change the world. The
spirit of reform that permeated much of American society during the Kennedy era was
instrumental to the Peace Corps attempt “to touch the deepest hopes of man.”18
However, in spite of its altruistic intentions, an important aim of the Peace Corps was to
aid “the United States in its cold war struggles with Russia and Red China.”19 Senator
Hubert Humphrey agreed, believing the Peace Corps “to be a part of the total foreign
policy of the United States . . . to combat the virus of Communist totalitarianism.”20
In a January 1961 speech Nikita Khrushchev declared Soviet intentions to support
wars of national liberation and revolutionary movements in the Third World. Apart from
promoting reform, Kennedy was a staunch supporter of counterinsurgency and military
aid to Latin America, believing it would help maintain U.S. influence within Latin
American militaries.21 Moreover, the Kennedy administration advocated
counterinsurgency to counter Soviet pressures and subversion in the developing world by
suppressing guerrilla movements before they could become another Cuba. Consequently,
military aid and the training of Latin American troops in counterinsurgency methods
were stepped up. From 1962 through 1965 the annual amount of military assistance to
Latin America was $129 million, up from $58 million annually from 1953 through
1961.22 Some scholars even point to the Kennedy administration as expanding the role of
the military in Latin American life.23

18

Milton Viorst, ed., Making a Difference: The Peace Corps at Twenty Five (New York:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986), 18.
19
Brent Ashbranner, A Moment in History: The First Ten Years of the Peace Corps (Garden City:
Doubleday & Company, 1971), 315.
20
Ibid., 316.
21
Rabe, 12.
22
Wright, 69.
23
Rabe, 147.

8

Although Kennedy’s rhetoric promoted democracy, his administration did not
always side with democratic reformers. The Bay of Pigs fiasco, according to one
historian, only hardened Kennedy and made him “less tolerant of reform and radical
movements in the hemisphere.”24 This was evident when, in deviating from Alliance
goals, the United States refrained from publicly denouncing the military coup in
Argentina in 1962 that removed Alliance supporter Arturo Frondizi. Nor did Washington
intervene when the democratically elected reformer Juan Bosch was overthrown in a
bloodless military takeover in the Dominican Republic in 1963.
If we are to believe his words, Kennedy, adhering to the Domino Theory,
perceived the spread of communism as a threat to U.S. security. A couple of months
before his death he said, “I know full well that every time a country, regardless of how
far away it may be from our own borders, . . . passes behind the Iron Curtain the security
of the United States is thereby endangered.”25 This may aid in explaining the heavy
reliance on counterinsurgency and the often cold response shown to reformers in Latin
America. One Latin American scholar, in assessing the situation, claims that “the
commitment to democracy, ambivalent from the start, was undermined fatally by
Washington’s profound, persistent faith in counterinsurgency.”26 Another believes that
the “fear of communism overwhelmed the administrations desire for social justice.”27
With Kennedy’s death, U.S. policy under Lyndon Johnson shifted back to
stability over democracy, if, depending on how one examines policy versus rhetoric,
there ever was much of a shift (U.S. commitment to reform in Latin America is still
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debated among historians). Johnson dismantled the personnel established by Kennedy
that launched the Alliance for Progress and focused more on domestic issues. He did not,
however, relent in the U.S. effort to prevent another Cuba in the hemisphere. The most
glaring example of this was the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 that
prevented reformer Juan Bosch from returning to power. At the onset of the
minirevolution Johnson sent in 450 marines at the request of the U.S. ambassador to
protect American lives. The next day there were 4,000 U.S. troops in the capital and talk
emanating from Washington of an international communist conspiracy. Within two
weeks the United States had 22,000 troops in the country and Johnson declared that the
United States “cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another
communist government in the Western Hemisphere.” This was based on a list of fiftyeight communists who were thought to have been participating in the revolution. None
were in positions of power, and it turned out many were not in the country at the time of
fighting.28 Some historians see this event as a turning point in U.S. policy towards Latin
America; that it “brought to an end any effort during the decade for multilateral
cooperation”29 and “demonstrated that the traditional ways of doing business had not
really changed.”30
U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic cemented a shift in policy articulated
a year earlier by Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, Thomas Mann. The
Mann Doctrine held that the United States would tolerate military or rightist regimes that
followed a tough anti-communist line31 and made it clear that the possibility of a

28

Molineu, 78.
Tulchin, 28.
30
Molineu, 80.
31
Wright, 74-75.
29

10

communist takeover in the hemisphere warranted U.S. intervention.32 The “Doctrine
amputated one of the three legs on which the Alliance rested” and “implied that the
United States had lost interest in the social reform goals of the Alliance as well.”33 With
reform in Latin America no longer a major concern and with U.S. attention now on
events in Southeast Asia, Latin America was back to the low priority it held prior to
1958.34
Most historians agree that the U.S. attempt at uplifting Latin America in the 1960s
and instituting true reform was a failure. The Alliance for Progress did not reach its lofty
goals, Latin America had few gains, and there was the un-Alliance like continuation of
non-democratic governments supported by the United States. One scholar points out the
irony in this by suggesting that rather than presenting itself as a force for change in Latin
America, the United States began to be perceived as a counter-revolutionary power that
“ended the decade as a blind opponent of progressive regimes and an equally blind
supporter of military regimes, whose only claim to legitimacy was fervent anticommunism and the violent suppression of dissidents.”35
It is in this context that this study, by focusing on Colombia, examines the Peace
Corps as a part of U.S. policy in Latin America. A key cold war partner of the United
States and central to U.S. foreign policy in the region, Colombia became the first Latin
American nation to receive Peace Corps volunteers. In September 1961 sixty-two
volunteers arrived in Colombia to take part in a rural community development project to
create “an informed local citizenry that understands democracy at the grass roots level. . .
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.”36 By the mid 1960s approximately 700 volunteers had been sent to Colombia,37 and
throughout the 1960s only Brazil (1965-1968) surpassed Colombia in the number of
volunteers in Latin America.38 Yet, despite the work of Peace Corps volunteers and the
hundreds of millions of dollars in aid from the Alliance for Progress, the communist
threat remained and guerrilla groups continued to function beyond the reach of
authorities. Furthermore, in the 1960s and early 1970s Colombia experienced an eruption
of social movements and revolutionary activity that has plagued the country up to this
day.
Colombia was a nation already marred by internal conflict and the rise of
communist guerrilla groups. Young urban radicals, inspired by Castro’s victory, believed
the time was ripe for revolution. Student groups formed with some actively pursuing
change through violence, as seen in their role in the Army for National Liberation (ELN),
a communist guerrilla group that emerged in 1964 and remains active today. Confronted
with a growing communist threat in Colombia, U.S. policymakers applied a new
approach to prevent the spread of communist influence in the Western Hemisphere. One
facet of this new commitment to development and reform was the Peace Corps, which
became an instrument in maintaining a stable and communist-free hemisphere with its
emphasis on improving the lives of the impoverished and spreading goodwill.
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Historical Background: Colombia
Since its independence, Colombia has experienced numerous periods of instability
and bloodshed. This instability has been partly due to a fractured landscape and rugged
mountains that allow large regions of the country to live outside the reach of the central
government. Shortly after independence, Colombia’s elites split into two competing
political parties, conservatives and liberals. These two parties, with their local armies and
strong loyalty, kept Colombia under near constant civil war for much of the nineteenth
century. Though it has been plagued by partisan political violence throughout its history,
Colombia has one of the longest running democracies in Latin America, albeit a limited
democracy under a two party system controlled by an oligarchic elite. This oligarchy is
composed of families who have participated in politics since the nineteenth century and
have stubbornly opposed expanding the democratic process, often resorting to civil war
in order to prevent the opposing party from attaining power or expanding the powers of
the central government. In 1946 these same partisan feuds culminated in La Violencia, a
bloody, primarily rural civil war that would last nearly twenty years, cost some 200,000
lives, and usher in a military dictatorship that would challenge the traditional parties’
power base.
Fearing the further erosion of their influence, in 1958, after nearly five years of
military rule, the two parties disposed of the military dictatorship and agreed on a power
sharing government, the National Front. It lessened the violence and reinstated the elites’
control over the government. However, the National Front closed off the democratic
process as it called for the alternating of the presidency between the two parties for
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sixteen years and set up the sharing of all government and judicial posts.39 According to
one scholar, the National Front “froze any expression of social conflict, excluded the
subordinate classes from politics, and gave all institutional power to the two political
parties of the dominant classes.”40 Using their control over local and national
government, Colombian landowning elites quickly expanded their landholdings in
commercial farming and cattle ranching at the expense of small landowners. These large
landowners, who were highly represented in Congress, made instituting real, productive
land reform nearly impossible.41 As the violent elements of La Violencia were being
liquidated in the early to mid-1960s and large landowners were expanding their holdings,
communist guerrilla groups emerged, challenging the state in isolated areas where its
presence was traditionally weak. Colombia, with its rugged mountains and weak central
state, offered an ideal setting for guerrilla warfare at a time when the U.S. government
worried about another Cuban style revolution in Latin America. Colombia thus became a
testing ground for Kennedy’s new policies.
U.S.-Colombian relations have been close since the 1920s when the United States
compensated Colombia for the controversy over the Panama Canal. Colombia sided with
the United States during World War II, and relations grew stronger during the Cold War,
with Colombia’s commitment to the anticommunist cause exemplified by it being the
only Latin American nation to send troops to fight in the Korean War. By the late 1950s
Colombia, still embroiled in civil conflict, sought internal security assistance from the
United States. The United States agreed to send aid, for as one specialist notes, “U.S.
39
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national interests required that Colombia, given its strategic Caribbean location, not be
allowed to sink into turmoil and revolution that might lead to a government hostile to the
United States.”42
Throughout the 1960s Colombia continued to be a focal point of U.S. policy in
Latin America. Its proximity to the Panama Canal and its important location as a
gateway to the Caribbean and the rest of South America–it shares a border with
Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador–made Colombia a principal recipient of U.S. aid to
keep the region stable and free from communism. The Colombian oligarchy, staunchly
anticommunist, was a willing partner and appealed for more aid to eliminate the
emerging communist guerrilla groups. It was under these conditions that the Kennedy
administration introduced the Alliance for Progress and sent the Peace Corps to Colombia
in an effort to improve the living conditions of millions of Colombians who otherwise
might have been seduced by communism.
The Peace Corps had hopes of facilitating reform and fostering better relations
with the underdeveloped world, and some policymakers thought it could help prevent the
spread of communism. By using former Peace Corps volunteers in Colombia as a case
study, this thesis examines the work and experiences of volunteers from their perspective
and how their work was assessed by the Peace Corps and reported on by the agency.
Was there agreement on the successes and failures? What was the Peace Corps reporting
to the public and Washington? And did the reports correspond with the views of the
volunteers? In addressing these questions, this study will highlight the similarities and
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discrepancies of Peace Corps publications from the accounts of volunteers in Colombia
during the 1960s.
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CHAPTER ONE
BIRTH OF THE PEACE CORPS AND ITS ROLE IN U.S. COLD WAR POLICY
Although Kennedy presented his idea for the Peace Corps to America shortly
before being elected president in 1960, he was not the first to envision such an
organization. During the 1950s a peace corps had been advocated or alluded to by
prominent Americans like Nelson Rockefeller and Senator Hubert H. Humphrey.
Rockefeller thought the United States needed to demonstrate to the world its positive
characteristics and ideals rather than only stressing what it was against.43 Humphrey
suggested a people to people program that emphasized education, healthcare, vocational
training and community development. He touted the program during his failed campaign
for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1960 and was the first to use the name
“Peace Corps” in a June 1960 Senate bill.44
During the mid-1950s the Soviets were attempting to strengthen ties with the
Third World. Soviet trade in Latin America had expanded by 34 percent in 1955, and the
following year the Twentieth Communist Party Congress declared a policy to compete
with the West for the allegiance of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The Soviets had
also toured and promised assistance to the recently independent nations of Egypt,
Indonesia, and India.45 By the end of 1956 the Soviets had signed fourteen economic and
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military assistance agreements with nations in the Middle East and Asia.46 As one
scholar of the period notes, “The Cold War, the fear that the West might lose it, and the
increasing attention to political and psychological warfare in the twentieth century all
provided one framework in which policymakers and even the public could readily
understand the need for something like the Peace Corps and see the advantages it would
bring.”47
In March 1961 Kennedy made the Peace Corps a reality by signing an executive
order, and Congress followed with the Peace Corps Act in September 1961 “to promote
world peace and friendship.” The purpose of the program, as stated by the Peace Corps,
was to “help the people of these countries meet their needs for trained manpower; help
promote a better understanding of the American people on the part of peoples served; and
to promote a better understanding of other peoples on the part of the American people.”48
Accomplishing these objectives, some policymakers believed, would serve U.S. interests
in the Cold War.
The Peace Corps was a product of the times, an era of Kennedy idealism as well
as the dark shadows of the Cold War. Some scholars believe that it was born out of the
United States’ cold war policy. One claims that the Peace Corps “was a countermove
against the Soviets and a gesture of friendship toward the third world,”49 and that it owes
“its political existence to the cold war and to Kennedy’s belief that Washington needed to
compete more effectively with Moscow for the allegiance of newly independent
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countries.”50 When examined closely, one sees that the Peace Corps was created with
objectives more profound than what was stated in the 1st Annual Peace Corps Report. It
was an organization that was designed to bring change to underdeveloped nations:
political, social and economic reform that for many nations would have been considered
radical for the times; changes that government was either unable and or unwilling to
implement. The Peace Corps at times referred to volunteers as “change agents,”51 and it
was not unusual to hear the word “revolutionary” in referring to volunteers’ work. Kirby
Jones, a volunteer in the Dominican Republic (1963-1965) who later became Program
Operations Officer in the Latin American Division of the Peace Corps, addressed
volunteer work in community development. He described it as “a process aimed not at
material ends, but rather at the poverty in men’s minds.”52 It was the volunteer’s job to
facilitate change, to encourage people to organize and work together for a common good.
As Jones said, “In many underdeveloped countries where the restraining forces are too
great to allow the people to break out of their present conditions, external, catalytic forces
are necessary to spark the community and to show the way to the developmental process.
This is the task of Volunteers–to provide this spark, to serve as agents of change through
community development.”53 Community development, according to Jones is “a means to
social revolution,”54 and the volunteer “an instigator of social revolution.”55
Jack Hood Vaughn, the second Director of the Peace Corps, also saw
revolutionary potential in volunteer work. Vaughn had been stationed in rural Bolivia in
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the late 1950s and returned for the Peace Corps in 1965. He recounted the transition of
indigenous people who, with the help of the Peace Corps, had built their first school and
clinic and secured potable water. Furthermore, he remarked on the change in attitude and
willingness of the people, the pride and self-respect they exuded in bringing about change
in their community. This, to Vaughn, was “real revolution.”56 The official stated
purpose of the Peace Corps does not include the words reform or revolution nor show the
intent to keep pace with or deter Soviet communism. However, the Cold War was a
driving force behind the Peace Corps, and although Sargent Shriver said the Peace Corps
was not a tool of the Cold War, he believed it could help in winning it.57
In August 1961 Shriver took part in a Congressional Committee on Foreign
Affairs to discuss the proposed Peace Corps bill. The committee found discussion
frequently returning to the subject of communism. One member expressed concern that
the Peace Corps would be infiltrated by communists, bringing disrepute on the program.58
Committee member Marguerite Stitt Church wanted to be certain that volunteers would
be trained in “facts about this country, facts about its purpose, and particularly an
enthusiasm for human freedom.”59 To Church, the Peace Corps seemed a good idea, but
it was of the utmost importance that it succeed. “If this Peace Corps concept fails,” she
said, “more fails than the program itself. An ideal falls or a hope falls, a dream becomes
unrealizable.”60 Though not directly stated, it can be implied that freedom is in contrast
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to Soviet or Chinese totalitarianism and that failure would be a setback to the U.S. cold
war effort.
Shriver was further questioned by the committee about training volunteers “in
Communist ideology and tactics.” He claimed that training on communism was
thorough, that potential volunteers were given books, films, lectures and demonstrations
on the topic.61 Congressman Laurence Curtis, an enthusiastic supporter of the program,
thought it would advance cold war policy. He gave a personal account of a friend who
was teaching in Ghana whose work was being undercut by Russian and Chinese
technicians and teachers. Expanding American presence around the globe, Curtis
explained, was imperative to U.S. interests, for “our country needs more people that
could be helpful as representatives of a free society, because whether we like it or not the
cold war exists.” The Peace Corps “would help bring the American presence to those
developing countries, in a sense, in competition with the agents that are swarming in from
behind the Iron Curtain.”62 This discussion between Shriver and Congressman Curtis
continued:
Mr. Curtis. Would you agree with me that the Soviet bloc countries are sending
out a great many more technicians, teachers, and other people to make their
presence felt around the world than we are and there is a great need for more
emphasis on that sort of thing?
Mr. Shriver. I don’t think there is any question about it. This committee, I am
certain, already has facts presented to you privately–
Mr. Curtis. The Peace Corps can help fill that need?
Mr. Shriver. Yes, sir. We certainly hope so. We have to be able to go into
countries where this is going on.63
Shriver was aware of the need to offset the Soviets and Chinese and believed the Peace
Corps could provide the means to assist this effort by placing Americans in countries
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where the Communists were attempting to spread their influence. In September 1961, as
the first group of volunteers was arriving in Latin America, Shriver told Kennedy that
500 volunteers were needed to “make a real dent in the Colombian situation.” This was
in response to the perceived gains being made by the Soviets, who had just sponsored 280
Colombian students on a three month educational trip to the Soviet Union. Shriver
ultimately proposed that volunteers should be placed in at least half of the twelve
thousand small towns in Colombia.64
Reflecting on the first five years of the Peace Corps, Shriver stressed his belief in
the potential power of the American volunteer by recounting a conversation he had with
then Prime Minister of Burma, U Nu, as the program was being initiated. When asked if
an American volunteer would be able to match the dedication and determination of
someone from Communist China, Shriver assured Nu that “. . . our Peace Corps people
will be dedicated. They will believe in and live up to the best principles of American
democracy.”65 While Shriver recognized the potential of the Peace Corps to counter the
communists, he also thought it was an agency with goals that went beyond subverting
communism. This is best exemplified by a George C. Marshall quote he used to justify
the Peace Corps: “We are in the middle of a world revolution–and I don’t mean
Communism. The Communists are . . . just moving in on the crest of a wave. The
revolution I’m talking about is that of the little people all over the world. They’re
beginning to learn what there is in life, and to learn what they are missing.”66
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Senator Jack B. Miller was another who viewed the Peace Corps within the
framework of cold war policy. In debating a bill for the Peace Corps, he introduced an
amendment that required all corpsman be trained in “the philosophy, strategy, tactics and
menace of communism.”67 The Press also realized the seriousness and potential of Peace
Corps work. Reporting on the first few months of Peace Corps activity, an article
commented on the anti-poverty, anti-hunger and anti-tyranny mood in Latin America:
“The Peace Corps is trying to relieve the sting of these evils and deprive Communists of
their most forceful lever.”68
Numerous verbal attacks came from Communist nations around the world at the
inception of the Peace Corps. Within the first year the Peace Corps reported that African
nations in particular were under pressure from communists to not associate with the
agency.69 Attacks came from Moscow, China, Cuba, and Czechoslovakia to name a few.
Nikita Khrushchev was highly critical in a May 30, 1962 speech:
The United States government recently formed the so-called Peace Corps, whose
soldiers are engineers, surgeons, teachers, students. The imperialists understand
well that now they cannot keep their domination only with the help of the Bible
and troops. Along with force, the imperialists strive to preserve their dominion in
the former colonial countries with the aid of the ideological indoctrination of the
population, the use of economic means of enslavement. But these tactics will not
save them from failure. For it is clear that the so-called Peace Corps or the
Alliance for Progress in Latin America are weapons of imperialism.70
The Peace Corps also reported a verbal onslaught from Communists in its second and
third annual reports.71 The evidence illustrates the visibility of the Peace Corps on a
global scale and its participation, whether sought out or not, in the Cold War.
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Colombia
As previously noted, Colombia was an essential part of U.S. policy in Latin
America from the end of WWII to the early 1960s72 in spite of the scant attention paid to
the region as a whole. It held strategic importance to the United States and witnessed
increased U.S. involvement in Colombian military and economic life. The April 1948
assassination of the Colombian populist leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán heightened U.S.
concerns of communism and stability in the region. At the time the United States blamed
an international communist conspiracy for the killing and several days of riots that
ensued. Known as the Bogotazo, the upheaval wrought such havoc on the capital Bogotá
that it threatened toppling the government and left some 2,500 people dead.73 An
interesting side note to this incident was the presence of Fidel Castro. Castro was in
Bogotá as a delegate to a congress of Latin American university students and was
scheduled to meet with Gaitán in the afternoon of his death (Castro had already met with
Gaitán a few days prior). After the assassination and as the insurrection grew, Castro was
one of a crowd who attacked a police station, armed himself with a rifle and joined a
group preparing to move on the Presidential Palace. Apparently, as the afternoon
dragged on, amid the chaos, he found the situation useless and was flown out of the
country the following day by the Cuban ambassador to the Pan American Conference.74
By 1950 The United States had established Army, Navy and Air Force attaches in
Colombia, and in the latter part of the decade provided funds to combat active communist
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subversion. 75 U.S. officials maintained a vigilant eye on Colombia, sending an antiguerrilla specialist team in 1959 to assess the situation. The analysis concluded that
financial assistance should be provided to the Colombian government.76 The violence
from Colombia’s civil war, la Violencia, had receded by this time but had not been
completely extinguished. The U.S. ambassador to Colombia, John Moors Cabot,
reported in 1959 that the economic situation in Colombia must first improve to lessen the
ongoing political and social conflict that had been raging since the latter part of the
1940s.77 The Alliance for Progress and the Peace Corps would seek to address this issue.
Throughout the 1950s the United States was engaged and working with
Colombian authorities in the name of anticommunism and hemispheric defense. The
groundwork had already been laid for massive U.S. aid in the form of the Alliance for
Progress and Peace Corps volunteers. In addition, counterinsurgency was stepped up to
confront an emerging guerrilla problem. Colombia was on its way to becoming a
showcase for U.S. policy in Latin America. The Peace Corps cooperated in the overall
U.S. plan for Colombia, but rural development in the 1960s, argues one scholar, “was
nothing more than the velvet glove to the iron fist of counterinsurgency.”78
The Alliance for Progress
While Congress was preparing to pass a Peace Corps bill, the United States was
greatly expanding its involvement in Latin America with the Alliance for Progress.
Kennedy announced the Alliance in March 1961–the same month he signed the
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Executive Order for the Peace Corps–and it was formally established in August of the
same year. One historian called the Alliance “the United States’ most highly publicized
response to the Cuban Revolution.”79 In announcing its creation Kennedy called on
multilateralism:
I have called on all the people of the hemisphere to join in a new Alliance for
Progress–Alianza para Progreso–a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in
magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American
peoples for homes, work and land, health and schools–Techo, trabajo y tierra,
salud y escuela.
Kennedy appealed to nations to work cooperatively for change, for
. . . political freedom must be accompanied by social change. . . . But we call for
social change by free men, change in the spirit of Washington and Jefferson, of
Bolívar and San Martín and Martí, not change which seeks to impose on men
tyrannies which we cast out a century and a half ago. Our motto is what it has
always been: “Progress yes, tyranny no–Progreso sí, tiranía no!” 80
The Alliance had ambitious plans for the region: $20 billion in funds during the
decade, primarily provided by the United States, to promote development and improve
living conditions. It sought a minimum growth rate of 2.5 percent annually, more
equitable distribution of income, tax and agrarian reform, elimination of illiteracy, a
minimum six years of schooling for all children, public health measures to raise life
expectancy and an increase in low-cost housing.81 The grand hopes of the Alliance for
Progress, however, were never met, though there were thousands of people who benefited
from potable water projects, clinics, roads and housing developments.82 Most agree that
it was a failure in meeting its objectives and bringing about significant change to Latin
America. One expert explains the failure:
79

Wright, 70.
Raul Saez S., “The Nine Wise Men and the Alliance for Progress,” International Organization
22, no.1 (Winter 1968): 252.
81
Wright, 71.
82
Ibid., 72.
80

26

. . . no Latin American government could be persuaded to take the goals of the
Alliance for Progress seriously. Dictators were not interested in stepping aside to
watch democracy take root and flower; oligarchs were not anxious to share power
with slum dwellers; the wealthy did not rush forward to reduce their share of the
national income; landowners did not push legislation to dismantle the land tenure
system they controlled.83
It is also argued that the Alliance may have worked against U.S. intentions by
raising the expectations of Latin Americans only to have their frustrations with
government intensified when governments failed to enact reform.84 A government study
on U.S. aid to Colombia in the 1960s asserts that U.S. assistance made it possible for the
Colombian government to postpone basic reforms that the United States was advocating,
such as taxation, education, local government, agriculture and public administration.85
The United States was also criticized for putting the short-term security of a country
ahead of the potential benefits of long-term reform. Consequently, military governments
were supported in their crackdown against subversives, a blatant shift from the goals of
the Alliance.86
In August 1962 Chester Bowles, Kennedy’s Special Representative and Adviser
on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs, listed development criteria that placed
Colombia “. . . in the vanguard of the Alliance for Progress.” But he warned against
lowering the standards for nations to receive aid “because of short-term political
pressures.” However, the above mentioned government study’s assessment for the
decade criticized the United States for “repeatedly” succumbing “to the short-term
political pressures against which Bowles warned. . . . This type of aid,” declared Bowles,
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“conflicts with long-term development goals by facilitating postponement of necessary
host country reforms.”87 Thus the Alliance may have at times been counterproductive to
facilitating reform in Colombia.
Peace Corps Training
At its inception, the Peace Corps faced the monumental task of preparing
volunteers to go abroad to ensure the program’s success. The main goal was to train the
volunteers to maximize their chance of success in the field. Initially, the Peace Corps had
to ask itself who would conduct training, where would it be held, and what should be
taught in a limited time? It decided to use colleges and universities based on their
physical and intellectual resources. By September 1965 102 colleges and universities had
trained Peace Corps Volunteers. Programs addressed several areas: Technical studies,
area studies, language studies, American studies, world affairs, health and medical
training, physical training and an orientation. Training was also designed to focus on the
particular job that volunteers would be doing, thus adjusting it to best suit volunteers’
needs.88 A typical training session was eight to ten sixty-hour weeks. An example of this
is demonstrated in a 1964 training manual for volunteers assigned to Colombia and Peru.
Of the approximate 600 hours of training, 250 went towards language training, 160 to
technical studies, and 120 to “World Affairs and Communism, United States Studies and
Area Studies.”89 Some later trainees got hands-on experience working in New York City
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slums prior to leaving for Colombia.90 Implemented in 1964, some volunteers assigned
to Latin America had an additional two to four weeks training in Puerto Rico. The final
stage of training took place in the host country to provide on-site orientation and an
introduction to the culture and further language and technical training.91
The first group of volunteers to Colombia was trained at Rutgers University and
was to be a part of a rural community development program. One objective of their
training was “to provide a basic knowledge of Community Development as a significant
technique of progressive social change.”92 Community development training and
language instruction were two difficult areas for the Peace Corps. Imprecise by nature,
Peace Corps officials were uncertain exactly what community development volunteers
would be doing, and no one was quite sure how to train them.93 Not having any
knowledge of the language posed another problem as one-third of the first group to
Colombia knew no Spanish.94 This first group of volunteers to undergo training and the
second to be sent abroad did a commendable job. Morris Stein’s study on the group
concludes that an overwhelming number of Colombians had a positive view of the
volunteers’ work and very favorable opinion of the United States.95 This is in addition to
the tangible results: forty-four rural schools completed, twenty-nine rural roads, twentyseven aqueducts, four health centers, more than one hundred sports fields, twenty-six
cooperatives and numerous projects that were started and under construction when the
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first group finished.96 In order to compare Peace Corps work in Colombia with official
reports, it is necessary to take a closer look at the experiences and work through the eyes
of the volunteers.
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CHAPTER TWO
PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS IN COLOMBIA
Most Peace Corps volunteers that served in the 1960s were born during the years
around World War II. They were products of a time Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman defined as
America’s heroic age; a period from 1940 to 1968 when Americans believed that they
were endowed with the ability and the right to the moral leadership of the world. This
idea of America as a distributor of goodness and a model for the world to imitate dates
back to early American history. John Winthrop had pronounced in 1630 that America
“shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us.” Thomas Jefferson
referred to the nation as “the last best hope of mankind.” Abraham Lincoln “eloquently
reinforced the assumption that the United States served as an exemplar.” Theodore
Roosevelt flexed American muscle for the world to see but also thought it was a nation
with the power to improve the world. Woodrow Wilson was another advocate of using
American might to benefit others and dreamed of “making the world safe for
democracy.” This heroic age, according to Hoffman, came to an end with the folly of
U.S. involvement in Vietnam. But before Vietnam undermined U.S. prestige, America
looked to one of its most attractive heroes of the era, John F. Kennedy, to guide them
through tense and dangerous times. Kennedy conveyed the idea that the United States
had a higher purpose in the world than simply confronting the Soviet Union; and what
better way to demonstrate the goodness and morality of America than through the Peace
Corps, “perhaps the most explicitly humanitarian means of foreign policy ever
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undertaken on a long-term basis.”97 It is within this historical context that Peace Corps
volunteers and their experiences in Colombia will be examined.
Volunteer Motivations, Ideals and Expectations
Personal motivations for joining the Peace Corps varied, but there were a few
main reasons that most volunteers noted that compelled them to seek the challenges of
the Peace Corps. Helping others, the inspiration of Kennedy, seeking adventure, learning
a language and experiencing Colombian culture were most noted by volunteers. There
was a sense of idealism among many volunteers and a conviction that they could, if not
change the world, at least make life better for a few individuals. Emilie Keas, who
volunteered during the latter 1960s said, “I was an idealist, motivated by
humanitarianism, wanting to help people, wanting to work in other cultures” and had an
“interest in languages.”98 She was not alone in holding such feelings. Michael Town
wanted to help others, see the world, and perfect his Spanish, while also being motivated
by Kennedy and a love for Latin culture.99 Referring to Kennedy was common, as one
volunteer professed that she “was inspired by President Kennedy’s words . . .”100 and
another admitted to being “a big fan of JFK whom I had met once.”101
Service to the United States and altruism were also factors in volunteers’
eagerness to go abroad. Ronald W. Owens expressed his desire “to experience another
country, change the world, do good works and travel.”102 Denny Kaltreider, only a year
out of high school when he began his work, admitted that there was a discrepancy
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between his ideals and the reality of working in Colombia. He “hoped to help change
some lives ‘for the better,’ . . . to bring a sense of hope and accomplishment” to the
Colombians and himself, but “realistically . . . hoped to be able to cope and survive my
first venture away from home.”103 Darrel Young explained his motivations in three
words: “Service, Adventure, Education.”104 Those who undertook the challenge of the
Peace Corps were cut from a more adventurous mold than the typical American. In
addition to his desire to “improve the world,” Lee Paquette was driven by “a spirit of
adventure,” a motive not unique to himself.105 Dan Taylor cited altruism, a desire to
experience a different culture, adventure, a strong interest in Latin America “because of
the romance of it when I was growing up in the 1940s . . .” and an “avoidance of the 9-5
work world.”106 In addition to their altruism and Kennedy inspired sense of duty, many
volunteers had their own self interests in mind when deciding to commit their time and
energies to the Peace Corps. Reasons ranged from traveling, the experience of working
abroad and a longing to immerse themselves in another culture. Furthermore, many
sought to become fluent in Spanish, knowing this could not be easily done at home.
When volunteers set out for Colombia many had high expectations of what they
intended to accomplish, not all of which would be realized. One of the most frequently
mentioned goals was fostering understanding between Colombians and Americans.
Expectations included improving living conditions and infrastructure and teaching and
helping Colombians to solve their own problems, although a few volunteers were not
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exactly certain how they would be of assistance. One confessed he “had no idea what
benefit a BA Generalist such as myself could offer the people of Colombia. . . .”107
Projects and Relationships
Volunteers worked on a wide range of projects, some with specific assignments
like teaching, whereas others, particularly community development workers, had the
flexibility to gather local input and assess their needs as to what should be done. One of
the most common projects undertaken was that of school building. Agriculture was
another area that received attention, with volunteers often aiding in setting up personal
gardens for residents in the community. There was much work on completing roads,
aqueducts, bridges, irrigation, sanitation, and bringing potable water to communities.
Some volunteers worked in physical education, coaching, teaching, setting up sports
clubs and activities or constructing athletic fields or courts.
Richard Uebner’s work illustrates volunteer initiative as he began a project to
introduce Khaki Campbell ducks for egg production to fill a need for eggs in the local
market.108 A more unconventional project was undertaken by Kay Dixon and her coworkers who started an anti-rat campaign. The city provided the poison, and the
volunteers were responsible for distributing and setting the traps.109
Volunteers recounted their working and personal relationships with Colombians
in an overwhelmingly positive light. Most described Colombians as friendly and their
relations with them were very good to excellent. David J. Lillesand related his
experience: “I was treated beautifully and thought the Colombians were the nicest, most
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generous, kindest people I had ever met.”110 Another volunteer felt like an “honored
guest”111 while Denny Kaltreider described his relations with community leaders as
“absolutely sound, positive, rewarding, and productive for the most part.”112 Richard
Falxa was in Colombia when President Kennedy was killed and told how he was
“showered with love and sympathy,” that “Kennedy was worshipped” and “Americans
were loved.”113
Volunteers often worked closely with local priests who held much influence in the
communities and could impact volunteer effectiveness. Reid remarked on the
cooperation of the priest and the power he had in the community in which she worked.114
Taylor corroborated with priests in several sites. He and his Peace Corps partner would
occasionally dine with them, and some afternoons were spent drinking beer with the
younger priests, municipal officials or other community leaders. Taylor recalled a priest
who was supportive of their work and kind enough to allow them to use his flush toilet,
one of only three in town. In sum, Taylor said, “The Catholic church [sic] in Colombia
was very paternalistic and generally on the side of conservatives. But I also believe it
had a sincere interest in bettering the lives of its members, at least up to a point.”115
Paternalism on the part of Colombians is mentioned by other volunteers and will be
addressed in more detail later.
The misconception that volunteers were bringing bagfuls of money to
communities could affect local opinion of them. Lillesand claimed people “. . . were
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cordial but aware from prior PCVs [peace corps volunteers] having served in the area,
that my suitcase wasn’t full of money, and so I was of more idle curiosity than someone
to be reckoned with.”116 Mertens gave a similar account: “I was welcomed until the
locals realized I was not bringing bags of cash from USAID; then I was really on my own
to find other communities which were in greater need.” Mertens, through his own
persistence, would eventually reap rewards that seemed impossible at the inception of his
work.117 Glenn Wahlquist recounted the initial reaction he and his partner Richard
Uebner received: “When we reached our town, there was outright amusement on the part
of the people we first encountered and told of our mission. Their amusement stemmed
from this kind of observation from their viewpoint–How can two gringos from another
country who are linguistically challenged, who don’t know anyone, come in here and be
of any help?” Over time, they were able to assess local needs, form productive
relationships and complete some worthwhile projects.118
Because of the Cold War and the verbal assaults emanating from the communist
world, volunteers were often accused of being CIA operatives. Lillesand’s only
encounter with hostile Colombians was “with a couple of drunks who accused me of
being CIA, and demanded to see my ‘cedula’ (ID card) to see if I was or not.”119 Uebner
recounted a similar story as he was deemed CIA by outsiders to the community, but he
had support from the locals who defended him against the accusations. Though it took
some time, he was eventually welcomed and supported by the community and “had many
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close friends and ‘business partners.’”120 Paquette’s experience differed from other
accounts. According to Paquette, “The people were generally warm and friendly, but it
was also a strange place. Many people seemed to believe we were spies for the U.S. It
was very hard to get community action organized. Many people kept their distance. It
was not the typical warm and fuzzy story you get about interaction between villagers and
PCVs.”121
Few volunteers experienced open hostility, and those that did usually dismissed it
as an isolated incident that involved confrontations with strangers or university students.
One volunteer, however, was constantly harassed by an individual until one day he was
assaulted. He then had to spend two weeks living in the police barracks and required a
police escort to accompany him on his travels outside the village until the assailant was
deported from the town.122 Michael A. Town, who coached sports and organized athletic
groups, had “excellent” relations with the Colombians, but he also experienced “plenty of
hostility from the anti American [sic] types and folks who didn’t like [U.S.] policies. . . .
Several times I really had it out with hostile Colombians. They knew/learned I would
defend myself physically so they left me alone.”123 Emilie Keas found herself on the
street during a violent protest that led to riots and a state of siege being declared. In
Keas’ words,
My car (a jeep) was seized by a group of striking medical students. They started
rocking my car threatening to overturn it. They were screaming in Spanish ‘Why
did they kill Kennedy? Why did they kill Kennedy?’ (I was rather confused as I
thought they were referring to John Kennedy and that was several years prior. I
wouldn’t figure out why they were chanting this [sic]. Eventually they left my car
alone and my driver came back (he had run away). He drove me back to
120
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Montería (which was by then under siege). I hid out in the home of a Colombian
colleague. She saw me on the street and told me to come upstairs to her place as
there was a lot of turmoil in the streets. There was some anti-American chanting
going on interspersed in the chants agains [sic] the government for having shut
down a branch of (or all of it) the medical school. Some of the chants were antiAmerican involvement in Vietnam. I couldn’t get a taxi to take me home. That’s
when the wife of a colleague saw me and told me to go up to her apartment. 124
Robinson commented on the violence of the latter part of La Violencia that
consisted mainly of bandits and thugs. It seemed he was getting more than he had signed
up for as he explained:
I lived in a hostile environment with bandoleros running around the countryside,
raping, pillaging and cutting peoples heads off. Corte de Franela, Corte de
Corbata, y otros. Other than that and when I found out they shot you before
cutting off your head, I was ok with it. . . . Interestingly one night the mayordomo
of the experimental farm I lived on came in at about 2 or 3 in the morning and
said, Gary, los muchachos (bandoleros) están en el cafetal, and promptly slapped
a 38 in my hand and off we went into the pitch dark cafetal with me saying to
myself ‘what am I doing here?’ But they [bandoleros] took off and there was no
firefight.125
On a more subdued note, Robert Friedman remarked on the response he encountered after
commenting on Colombian racism: “I made the mistake of suggesting in a meeting that
included the Colombian official overseeing our project and his American counterpart that
there was plenty of discrimination towards dark skinned people in the country. I
suggested that it was not only a problem in the US but also a problem in Colombia. I was
soundly criticized by both the Colombian official and the PC counterpart.”126
Overall, from the point of view of the volunteers, relationships were pleasant,
satisfying and a rewarding part of their job. Violence was rare, and the threats or dangers
that are addressed above appear to have been random events that were most often a
matter of chance rather than intentional targeting of volunteers.
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Hardships and Obstacles
Volunteers faced numerous obstacles in their work, from apathy, lack of funding
and material resources, difficulty communicating in Spanish, to bureaucracy, a resistance
to change among Colombians, and unsanitary living conditions. As Paquette proclaimed,
quoting a Peace Corps slogan, “It was, in fact, the toughest job I’ve ever loved.”127 A
major challenge for volunteers was a lack of funds, equipment and resources to get work
done. Some complained there were “not enough resources from either the Peace Corps
or Colombian entities to provide material help.”128 A volunteer teacher emphasized how
well the Colombian school welcomed her and the amount of support she received from
the Peace Corps. However, she also noted the lack of space, equipment and tools for
recreational and physical education programs. She, in turn, looked to her own creativity
and flexibility to overcome the lack of materials needed to teach children.129 Projects
were often funded by CARE, the Colombian National Coffee Federation or with Alliance
for Progress dollars. One volunteer commented on the effectiveness of CARE,
applauding the agency for doing “an extraordinary job.” However, he felt the “Peace
Corps cut their contract [with CARE] because they could not stand the competition.
They delivered support to volunteers in an exemplary fashion. Peace Corps was more
lethargic.”130 Patrick Mertens, in contrast, filed a complaint that representatives of
CARE were stealing food for personal use, but it went nowhere.131
David J. Lillesand provided a wide ranging list of problems for development:
“Attitude. Hopelessness. Politics (liberal vs conservative). Insensitivity of the rich
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towards the poor. Apathy. The Catholic Church. Complete and utter lack of resources–
raw materials. Where do you start when you have nothing?” This did not, however, deter
him from productive work. Lillesand explained his ingenuity: “I worked on some water
purification projects, sanitation projects, and school building. We got our supplies–pipes,
cement, plastic tubing, etc–by dating the Colombian secretaries that worked in the
various agencies that had the parts we needed. I did get one small grant from the U.S.
Embassy to purchase a brick-making machine that we used to make the bricks that built
the school.”132
Not every volunteer was proficient in Spanish upon arrival in Colombia, making
an already tough job more difficult. Richard L. Uebner praised the extensive language
training he received but rated his lack of fluency in the language as probably the greatest
obstacle he faced.133 This problem was echoed by another who said “it took between six
months and a year before I was able to communicate sufficiently to be effective in
mobilizing any action.” Fortunately, the volunteer worked with others who were more
proficient in the language making it less of a hindrance.134
Perhaps the most disheartening of the barriers some volunteers confronted was the
resistance they encountered by the Peace Corps bureaucracy and the aversion to real
change by Colombians in power. One volunteer told of the intransigence she faced from
a local priest who horded materials and supplies. This, the volunteer believed, was a
result of her Protestantism and that she “represented a threat to the authority/power of the
parish/barrio priest. At that time . . . the parish priest was . . . a very powerful political
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figure in his neighborhood.”135 This did not, however, appear to be the norm, as many
volunteers commented on cordial relations with local priests.
When Kennedy spoke about the Peace Corps and Latin America he did so with
the belief that change could be brought to the underdeveloped world. Yet initiating
reform would require cooperation from Latin American elites, something in which many
did not adhere. The National Coffee Federation, a powerful force in Colombian political
life, was a prime example of elites opposed to mobilization of the peasantry and
meaningful reform. In some communities it was “the most dominant organization, . . .
very conservative . . .” and “had de facto veto power over all political appointments and
governmental actions.”136 Another volunteer called it “a paternalistic organization that
obviously didn’t really want change, but probably saw an opportunity to get Allianza
para El Progreso money by having a local community development program which
might result in some schools, or what not, to keep the peasants happy. . . . Both the
Coffee Federation staff and my partner seemed to throw up road blocks to doing much of
anything.”137
Patrick Mertens denounced what he perceived to be the obstinacy of Peace Corps
bureaucracy to facilitate real change. Hence, he took it upon himself to get grants and
implement projects to enable peasants to acquire an economic means to better their lives.
This was, declared Mertens, “The last thing that the powers that be wanted us to be
doing; for political power grows out of the barrel of a bank account.” He skirted Peace
Corps regulations by not sending in monthly reports, feeling it enabled him to make some
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progress. To this day, Mertens maintains contact with those he worked with nearly forty
years ago, a testament to the success of his work.138
Darrel Young best articulated the fear of empowerment of the populace that
political and economic elites harbored. Young wrote an article on his experience with
community development work in rural Colombia and the possibilities of a mobilized
community. He described the inauguration of an aqueduct project that provided potable
water:
As I look around the crowd, a thought crosses my mind that these are not the
people I’ve known since coming to El Chical over a year ago. They look the
same, but they seem to be carrying themselves differently. Shoulders are squarer;
heads are higher. Speech is still well mannered, but voices are stronger, more
confident. Eyes are not averted, but straight-ahead and hopeful. Another phrase
comes back to me, this time from somewhere out of my Peace Corps training.
‘Development is change in people.’ It is no longer just a phrase to me; it’s
happening right now, right before my eyes. These are the people of El Chilcal,
but now somehow more so.139
Young gave a textbook version of how community development should function and the
possibilities of a community united in a cause. A week after the inauguration the Coffee
Federation, without explanation, announced the cancellation of any future communityaction programs in Nariño. Budgetary concerns later became the official reason for
canceling future programs, but Young and others believed “those who controlled the
Nariño Federation had become increasingly suspicious of Acción Comunal [the
Colombian community action agency]. The more assertive attitude and bearing of folks,
as a result of self-help projects, which I had seen as something positive, they saw as

138

Mertens, questionnaire, 16 March 2007, 20 March 2007.
Darrel Young, “Saving the World: Charity vs. enfranchisement in El Chical,” WorldView
Magazine Online, 3: 11 October 2006 [journal on-line] (National Peace Corps Association); available from
http://www.worldviewmagazine.com/issues/dispatches.cfm?id=30; Internet; accessed 1 August 2007.
139

42

something threatening.”140 The Coffee Federation was willing to support projects in
Nariño but in the traditional sense: they would decide on a project, send in a crew and
almost overnight, with little to no input from local inhabitants, a new school or other
project would be completed. The locals would continue to be “treated like children and
reduced to objects of charity. . . .” It would serve “only to reinforce a status quo in which
they had no status.”141 When Young was asked about the general obstacles he faced in
his work, he expounded on the above account: “Those in power withdrew support from
Community Development not because it was a failure, but rather because it was a
success. When they saw it was empowering folks at the grass roots, the political and
economic elite feared loss of control.”142 These accounts shed light on the difficulties
and problems associated with organizing at the grass roots level and implementing reform
in Colombia.
Impact of the Peace Corps
Volunteers were asked to assess their work as to what impact they had and to
elaborate on the successes and failures of their work in Colombia. The accomplishments,
according to volunteers, involved their own personal growth, lasting friendships,
contributing to an improved quality of life for Colombians through tangible projects, and
creating a positive image of Americans and the United States. A small number felt that
they accomplished little, yet still proclaimed to have some positive impact.
The most visible impact is evident in the projects volunteers aided in constructing.
Schools, aqueducts, bridges, roads, and electrification projects were some products of
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volunteer sweat. The number of these in just the first two years of the Peace Corps in
Colombia has already been noted, but it is valuable to examine the impact as volunteers
perceived it. Ronald Owens modestly explained his participation in building a park and
classroom that provided books for the community. He downplayed his role by saying
Colombians could have done it without him, but that he was the catalyst in bringing
people together and completing projects that “had some small impact on improving their
lives.”143 A volunteer from the first group in Colombia commented that the Peace Corps
became a viable reality, peasants obtained a better sense of self, and electricity, schools,
and potable water became available where it had previously not existed.144 Ronald A.
Schwarz listed gardens that improved nutrition, an upgraded school building, roads that
opened up isolated communities, providing or improving access to water for some fifty
families and increasing access to markets for indigenous people.145 These examples
illustrate the improvements of the quality of life for some Colombians through volunteer
efforts.
Relationships and the change that occurred to volunteers are significant
consequences of two years in Colombia. Some, like Mertens and Mazer, still maintain
contact with those they met some forty years ago. Mazer fondly described the
relationships she established: “As a teacher, I ‘inherited’ or ‘acquired’ a complete family
who I got to know and love, just by being a part of the Colombian culture. I have
maintained my connections in the Colombian world and in the town where I lived.”146
Mertens pointed to the fact that villagers still remember him after forty years as evidence
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of the impact of his presence. One even visited him, recounting the many stories of his
activities.147 Lillesand explained that they “did a few things that made a difference in the
lives of some individuals and . . . created some expectations of the future,” but the
foremost change occurred to him. He explained: “I changed. Irreversibly. I lost my
religion (Catholicism), and gained a cause. I determined to come back to the [United
States] and become a lawyer for the poor. I became a follower of Saul Alinsky and other
troublemakers. I learned that I will never underestimate the capacity of the human being
to accept suffering. . . .”148 Speaking for many of his fellow volunteers, Paquette
expressed his feelings on the volunteer experience: “Every volunteer I knew, no matter
how rough the living conditions, believed that we gained much more than we were able
to give.”149 The transformation that volunteers underwent, remarked Paquette, had a
negative impact on some in Congress, who were not fond of what they saw as increased
radicalism among volunteers. He related his view on the matter: “Some members of
Congress began to realize that young Americans sent abroad, having a much better
understanding of what the underdeveloped world was like, returned to the U.S. with a lot
of empathy for the downtrodden, and a lot of criticism of the role our own government
was playing. . . . Certain senators and representatives wanted to de-fund the Peace Corps,
because many ex-PCVs seemed subversive to them.”150 The subject of Peace Corps
radicalism is not the focus of this study, but it is certain that volunteers returned from
Colombia with a new outlook on the world and profound changes to themselves.
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Volunteer accounts suggest that there was an understanding that was bridged
between cultures and a positive image created of the United States and its people. This is
particularly important under the larger context of U.S. foreign policy objectives noted
earlier as well as U.S. involvement in Vietnam that was condemned by much of the world
and damaging to America’s image abroad. The Peace Corps enlightened some
Colombians to the disparity between U.S. government policy and the individual
American. Uebner believes the Colombians he knew “learned that not all Americans
were rich and self-centered,” and “like those they read about in the papers.”151 Paquette
lamented that he was not able to get much done in an area “deemed not the most fertile
ground for PCVs,” but thinks “the biggest impact was that Colombians who came in
contact with us have a much better impression of everyday Americans than they
otherwise would have.”152 Robert Friedman expounded on this sentiment: “As a result of
my many good relationships with so many teachers in the schools in which I worked, I
believe I humanized the United States, by making them aware that Americans were
people with their own lives, attitudes, and problems. This was a side of the [United
States] they did not know.”153 The Peace Corps enabled Colombians to learn about
America through face to face contact with volunteers concerned about their well-being.
Ronald Owens expressed a similar view: “I think probably the greatest impact was the
interaction with the people I lived and worked with. They got to experience an American
who was working with them at their level and even though they knew my life was
different and was always going to be different [than] theirs, they I believe appreciated the
fact that we were trying to [understand] them and their needs as much as they were trying
151
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to [understand] me and my needs.”154 Kay Dixon grasped the larger scope of her work:
“At the time and still today, I feel that as an individual I had minimal impact in working
in Colombia, but as part of an overall movement in American policy, I feel the impact
was significant.”155 These sentiments should be noted by those who question the value of
the Peace Corps and its part, however small, of U.S. foreign policy. We recall the
original goals of the Peace Corps to promote understanding between Americans and
peoples of the world, and in spite of the immeasurable aspects, many volunteers
succeeded in fostering relations and understanding on a personal level and perhaps on a
national level as well.
Numerous accounts from prominent former volunteers exist that corroborate those
who served in Colombia. California Congressman Sam Farr, an advocate for the
expansion of the Peace Corps, served in Colombia in the mid-1960s and described his
time there as “formative” and “very powerful.”156 Senator Chris Dodd said “nothing has
shaped [his] life as powerfully.”157 Journalist and former speech writer for President
Carter, Chris Matthews revealed that the Peace Corps had a profound impact on his life,
one that Matthews said, “I can never fully convey. . . .” 158 Former volunteer and
ambassador to Togo, Brenda B. Schoonover wrote an article on the life lessons of the
Peace Corps. In it, she lists the traits volunteers acquire from their work: humility,
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patience, cultural insight into America as well the country being served, and the value
this deeper understanding bestows upon volunteers.159
In addition to these accounts, Morris Stein’s study of the first group of volunteers
in Colombia, 1961-1963, substantiates the experiences of volunteers. The work reveals
the paternalism some volunteers witnessed by the Coffee Federation in funding projects
while resisting independent organization among peasants, thereby preventing them from
realizing the potential of cooperative community action. Volunteers felt the “Cafeteros’
approach strengthened the ties and dependency of the villagers on the Cafeteros and also
increased the villagers’ indebtedness and obligation.”160 The fear of Colombian elites
losing their political power base is commented on, as is community development creating
a more active, aware and confident community familiar with democracy.161 Some
Colombian villagers, Stein reported, wondered if the Americans were cold war spies.
And Stein’s study supports the notion that the Peace Corps in Colombia during the 1960s
fostered relations and understanding. Of the Colombians who participated in his study,
about 90 percent responded favorably to volunteer work, 94 percent said the Peace Corps
was worthwhile, and 95 percent remarked that the United States had helped Colombia.
Overall, Colombians who interacted with volunteers looked favorably upon the United
States.162
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CHAPTER THREE
THE PEACE CORPS REPORTS ON ITS WORK
In 1962 the Peace Corps published the first of its annual reports, reporting on its
creation, activities, the reaction to the agency in the United States and abroad, and
information on volunteers and costs. Though the Peace Corps presented itself in an
overwhelmingly positive light, it did not fail to expose some of the agency’s faults and
disappointments. In addition to the yearly reports, the Peace Corps disclosed its work in
congressional hearings and presentations. Examination of these documents reveals that at
times the voices of the volunteers found an outlet through Peace Corps publications, but
often their experiences or criticisms went unreported.
After all the hype of creating the Peace Corps, the agency used its first annual
report to display the highlights of its work. The 1962 report consists of positive images
of volunteers on the job and personal accounts of early accomplishments. Tom Mullins
discussed projects underway in Colombia and remarked on the favorable reception of the
Peace Corps by the Colombian people. He admitted to difficulties in getting things
organized but was optimistic, believing that “Colombia has a great future.”163 The report
includes a description of projects under construction or already completed and the
assignments of the many teachers, emphasizing early results.164 The following year’s
report again highlighted Colombia, showing pictures of a school being built and a
volunteer playing with two young children on an improvised see-saw built of bamboo
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and a tree stump.165 The 3rd Annual Peace Corps Report published a letter from a
Colombian to the American volunteer that had been assigned to his village. He spoke of
the continued progress:
All the projects begun during your stay with us are progressing rapidly. The
women of San Bernardo no longer have to walk a half a mile for water. The
aquaduct [sic] has brought them the needed water. The Coffee Federation has
decided to begin two more schools and, more important, to allow the people of
Paltapamba and El Hatillo to participate in the construction. If you could only see
the enthusiasm of our people. So many know now that it is possible to have
things.166
Profiling volunteers, reports used their voices to divulge the volunteer experience.
They are accompanied by pictures of volunteers engaged in work, the captions touting the
good works being done. Patty Schwartz, a nurse in Bolivia, helped set up a twelve bed
hospital in a rural village. Her tale is exciting and uplifting as she described how
wonderful her week had been and that “so many good things have happened that we’re
just on clouds.” Her account epitomized the do-good Peace Corps volunteer as she
assisted in a surgery in which the doctor had warned the patient had only a 5 percent
chance of survival. The patient, defying the odds, survived, and the Peace Corps had a
story to display its value.167
A story from Africa highlighted the acceptance of the volunteer in African life,
with a photo of one sitting casually enjoying conversation with a local. Another captured
a volunteer teacher on the job in front of a classroom of attentive students.168 The 1966
report presented a pictorial history of the first five years of the Peace Corps. From
pictures of Kennedy promoting the idea of the Peace Corps to Sargent Shriver walking
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among Middle Eastern children, the progress and success of the agency was captured
through a lens.169 The same report profiled activities in Niger, exposing the problems the
Peace Corps faced and near failure during the first two years, but the following two years
were described as “just short of revolutionary.”170
One of the proclaimed successes the Peace Corps promoted was in fostering
relations and dispelling the negative perceptions of the United States. Titled a “Year of
Crisis,” a section of the 1964 report featured the Peace Corps flourishing amid tense and
dangerous situations in the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Cyprus, Panama and
Tanganyika. When the United States briefly suspended diplomatic relations with the
Dominican Republic after the September 1963 coup that replaced Juan Bosch, the Peace
Corps remained in country. Volunteers continued operations in spite of a dusk-to-dawn
curfew. According to the report, it was the only U.S. aid operation that was not
suspended and the new regime “expressed alarm that the Peace Corps might suspend
operations.” A reporter covering the coup called the agency “the most radical political
operation which the United States has going in the Dominican Republic–no less than in
the rest of Latin America.”171
The report also details activities during anti-American riots in Panama in January
1964. Although the agency had to briefly suspend activities, the report highlights the
positive treatment of volunteers. One volunteer reported during the protests that he “was
treated with the utmost kindness and invited to various Panamanian homes to have dinner
and converse peacefully with my many friends here who were looking after my best
interests.” Another said the Panamanians told her she was safer with them than in the
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Zone, and that the strong anti-American protests were not directed towards her or the
Peace Corps. In one village a vote was held on whether the volunteer should be allowed
to return. Of the 112 families that voted, 98 said yes and only 6 opposed. The report
showed how under such conflict, the Peace Corps endured even though Panama
temporarily severed diplomatic relations with the United States.172 The Peace Corps had
demonstrated its ability to transcend international politics in the name of peace and
cooperation among peoples, a view supported by volunteer accounts in Colombia.
The following year a crisis arose again in the Dominican Republic and provided
the Peace Corps with ammunition to showcase its value and purpose in its 1965 report.
The report devoted a section bearing the title “Dominican Republic: ‘The Human
Quotient’” to the uprising in the island nation. It began with a full page picture of Peace
Corps nurses tending to injured Dominicans in a Santo Domingo hospital. It then
presented criticism of the agency for aiding an enemy that was shooting at American
soldiers. A writer for the New York Herald Tribune called it “a war in which the U.S.
War Corps is at odds with the U.S. Peace Corps.”173 The criticism, according to the
report, left some wondering if the Peace Corps had become too entrenched in Dominican
life and questioned “whether the volunteers were ‘theirs or ours.’”174
The report also related volunteers’ perspectives of the upheaval and the lack of
hostile feelings towards the Peace Corps. As one said, “In such an environment within
which there was a definite degree of anti-American feeling, the Peace Corps received
practically none. It was as though the Peace Corps was an entity separate from
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everything else that was concerned with the conflict–as, in fact, it was.”175 The following
remark sums up this sentiment best:
There was one thing that overshadowed practically all the others, the
magic of the three words ‘Cuerpo de Paz’. If there was ever a testing ground for
the Peace Corps idea, it was during those terrible weeks. Upon identification as
Peace Corps at the various checkpoints, ‘Cuerpo de Paz’ was universally met with
smiles and acceptance. It was a proud time for me as it was for all of us.
I had a very strong reaction when a rebel soldier came up and called us
‘Hijos de Kennedy’–Children of Kennedy–and I think in this situation the
universal acceptance really hit me as what I considered the Peace Corps to be. I
felt very proud to be part of the organization–of a United States organization–in a
situation where there was so much anti-American feeling and yet we were totally
accepted.176
The Peace Corps prided itself on its ability to maintain a neutral position during the
conflict, boasting that the words “‘Cuerpo de Paz’ were the safest conduct pass
available.”177 This is the essence of what the Peace Corps was intended to do, and in its
words, the “problems of the revolution are beyond the realm of the Peace Corps, but the
human quotient is our province.”178 Though it is arguable that the Peace Corps presented
a one sided, biased account for propaganda purposes, it does, however, follow what
volunteers in Colombia asserted: that the Peace Corps was fostering relations and tearing
down negative images of the United States; that those who came to know these dedicated
Americans saw them in a separate light from the U.S. government.
The bonds like those developed in the Dominican Republic are showcased
throughout the 1960s reports. The agency professed its commitment to fostering
relations, stating that “building a bridge is no more important than building a friendship
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in Peace Corps work.”179 The reports support this by illustrating the inroads that had
been made in Venezuelan neighborhoods amid buildings plastered with anti-American
graffiti such as “CUBA SI YANKIS NO.”180 Bridging cultural gaps is demonstrated by a
Filipino newspaper’s assertion of the great strides made by the agency in achieving an
understanding with Asian peoples.181 Without hyperbole, the 1965 report features a story
on Afghanistan that furthers this sentiment. It tells the story of the Peace Corps popular
Hootenanny in Kabul, though laments that the agency is almost more famous for this
extracurricular activity than for its programs. The Peace Corps in Afghanistan had been
able to build trust in an area that had once seemed “almost futile.”182
Moreover, the 1965 report conveyed first-hand accounts by printing personal
letters and reprinting an article that had been published in the Swarthmore College
Bulletin. These letters express feelings and relate experiences that are in line with the
volunteers in Colombia. Immersing oneself in a different culture broadened horizons and
caused volunteers to view things from a new perspective. The transformation of the
volunteer is stressed while recognizing they were not working any miracles.183 One of
the more profound expressions of the volunteer experience was by a teacher in Nigeria.
A firm believer in the intellectual understanding obtained by crossing cultural boundaries,
the volunteer attempted to explain friendship and the impact of his time in Nigeria:
I don’t know how friendship fits into all this, but somehow it does. My instincts
revolt against the whole idea of having to prove, in some mechanistic or
quantitative way, the value of the Peace Corps. If the aim is to help people, I
understand that in the sense of the Ibo proverb which says that when the right
hand washes the left hand, the right hand becomes clean also. E. M. Forester has
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said that ‘love is a great force in private life,’ but in public affairs, ‘it does not
work. The fact is we can only love what we know personally, and we cannot
know much. The only thing that cuts a little ice is affection, or the possibility of
affection.’ I only know when I am infuriated by some article in a Nigerian
newspaper, I can summon up countless images of dusty cycle rides with Paul
Okpokam, reading poetry with Glory Nwanodi, dancing and drinking palm wine
with Gabriel Ogar, and it suddenly matters very much that I go beyond my
annoyance to some kind of understanding. That my Nigerian friends trust me is
no reason for them to trust Washington, or forgive Birmingham; but something is
there which was not there before, and which the world is the better for having.184
In 1966 the Peace Corps described the initiation of the agency as “a disarming,
fresh approach to international relations.”185 That year the agency flaunted its successes,
asserting it had earned “an almost saint-like reputation in places where the American
presence had sometimes been less than lovable. The word went out that the Peace Corps
was dispelling the ‘Ugly American’ image wherever it went.”186 When Cornell
University published a study on Peace Corps impact in Peru, the agency had no reason to
conceal its results. The findings claimed that development occurred three times as fast in
communities with Peace Corps volunteers, something one of the researchers believed
“some would consider . . . incredible.”187
In addition to the agency’s show of good relations, the Peace Corps presented
glowing reports from the domestic and foreign press, as well as communist recognition of
its success. After the first year of operations the agency pointed out the support it was
receiving from organizations and corporations in the United States.188 In a section titled
“Friends, Critics, and Enemies,” the second annual report dedicated twelve pages of
domestic and international press coverage commending the Peace Corps and exposing
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communist attacks. One of the attacks reported by the Peace Corps is on the verge of
comical. The Bolivian communist newspaper Unidad accused volunteers of being
mercenaries who carried “small light arrows activated by rockets . . . , a chemical
substance ‘capable of causing all the leaves of trees in a considerable area to fall
permitting the clearing of possible guerilla camouflage;’ and . . . ‘small bombs’ disguised
as ‘cigarette lighters.’”189 The third annual report also comments on the popularity of the
program demonstrated by the spread of volunteer programs among nations in spite of
continued communist attacks.190
The Peace Corps Assesses Itself
Peace Corps reports were not solely feel-good stories and news to further its
agenda. They also brought to light mistakes on part of the agency and changes that
needed to be made. The first year’s report recounted three stories that had received
widespread coverage. The first dealt with a volunteer who applauded a House UnAmerican Activities film at inappropriate moments, bringing calls for his dismissal. The
Peace Corps, however, refused to taint the selection process by succumbing to external
pressures. Also included was an incident that received international coverage when an
unflattering postcard from a volunteer in Nigeria was lost and surfaced in the hands of
Nigerian students who used it to denounce the Peace Corps. Although the incident
required damage control, Nigeria did not seem too bothered and requested more
volunteers. A final incident involved a sixty-five year old trainee who attributed her
dismissal to her inability to master the physical requirements of the training in Puerto
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Rico.191 These were more public image problems the Peace Corps had to contend with
rather than a revelation of serious predicaments volunteers faced or institutional issues
that needed to be addressed.
In assessing its second year the Peace Corps admitted to volunteer shortages that
resulted in delays and cutbacks of programs. In addition, there were instances of
volunteers’ talents not being fully utilized, although “through no fault of their own.”192
At times, efforts did not succeed, and volunteers were frustrated and disappointed in spite
of “ambitious and seemingly well-planned ventures.”193 When the working relationship
between the Peace Corps and Indonesia came to an end in 1965, the annual report only
dedicated five lines to the issue, blaming the gulf created by the political climate between
the two nations. It was followed by the earlier mentioned account of volunteers
remaining in the Dominican Republic during the rebellion.194
The Peace Corps was more critical of itself regarding training than any other
issue, providing an ongoing report of its problems and the changes implemented. The
1968 report, under a section “Training Gets Cool,” confessed “that many volunteers were
poorly prepared,” the criticism was that “volunteers learned about a country, but not how
to live in a country.” Training, according to the agency, had shifted to emphasize
experiential learning. The emphasis of the section is on the adaptations made to improve
volunteer training.195 The self criticism on training can be seen as early as the first report.
Evaluations were given to volunteers that revealed weaknesses in preparation that were
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corrected, yet the Peace Corps realized “that it still has much to learn.”196 The
complaints of lack of language proficiency that some volunteers in this study noted
appear to have been addressed by the Peace Corps. The following year reported that
language training was receiving more emphasis,197 and the next year boasted of an
advanced training program that increased language facility and gave volunteers more indepth studies of the host country.198
Confident in its ability to foster relations and improve lives, the Peace Corps
related negative press reports about the agency as well as volunteers unhappiness with
what they perceived as an over-glamorization of their work and hardships. These press
reports were more prevalent in the first few published reports than in those from the latter
part of the 1960s. The 1st Annual Peace Corps Report included negative and positive
press reports, including attacks from communist countries. While claiming the
overwhelming majority of U.S. press reports were positive, it did show doubts from some
who questioned the Peace Corps’ worth.199 The American press was more supportive in
1962-1963 than it had been in the first year but continued to have its doubters. An
Illinois newspaper called it “the most over-rated, over-publicized and over-sold travel
club in the world.” Another labeled it a propagation of Kennedy’s ideas of socialism that
would lead to “the abandonment of American Sovereignty.” A San Diego paper chided it
for resting “on the fundamental error that we are going to advance civilization and world
peace by helping a handful of people on the edge of a sea of human want. It’s like
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sending a lone nurse’s aid to pull all the aching teeth of the world.” 200
The press contributed to what the Peace Corps complained was an image versus
reality problem. Reporting on its second year, the agency admitted that “the true picture
abroad slipped out of focus. Successes loomed larger than life, while failures were
unnoticed or simply ignored.” The press needed to do a better job of presenting “a more
authentic version of the Peace Corps” and include the achievements as well as the
frustrations volunteers faced, something the report claimed was beginning to occur by
1963.201 The following year’s report, however, again addressed the image versus reality
problem. The image that had been plastered on papers around the nation did not
resemble the accounts of the majority of volunteers. “The realities of Peace Corps life . .
.” stated the report, “have little in common with the stereotype which persists in the
minds of the American public.” The stereotype of a “sweaty but wholesome American
youth, motivated by visions of self-sacrifice and adventure, who is living in a mud hut in
a jungle, somewhere across the seas” does not accurately portray the typical volunteer.
This image became a burden and “nemesis” to the “real” volunteer. The Peace Corps did
not attempt to capitalize on this glamorization. Rather, it took the stance that much of
what had been written was, “at best, an incomplete picture; at worst, a distorted one.”202
This was not an issue that would soon disappear. Two years later, in 1966, the agency
was still reporting that volunteers “were appalled and embarrassed by the extent to which
the Peace Corps was being romanticized by parents, friends and news media. The banal
realities of Peace Corps life” and the frustrations they encountered were glossed over.203
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The agency could be commended for its sincerity in not capitalizing on these one-sided,
at times embellished reports. However, in spite of its humility, much of the agency’s self
criticism was cloaked in positive accounts or dismissed as part of the learning process.
The Peace Corps Reports To Congress
In addition to the reports put out by the Peace Corps, the agency also provided
yearly reports to Congress, which did not veer much from its own annual reports. Nor
did much of what was presented reflect the sentiments the volunteers expressed when
discussing their experiences. Most of what was reported portrayed the good works and
success of volunteers, admitting at times the problems and obstacles that were
encountered, but quick to point to the learning process and changes that were being made
to correct them.
The majority of each report to Congress dealt with general information about the
agency such as budgets, where volunteers were serving and how many were in field.
However, most relegated some attention to exhibiting the benefits of the Peace Corps and
its work around the world. The 1963 report explained the need to have volunteers in
Latin America due to “its urgent needs, its proximity to the United States, and its central
importance to the well-being of this hemisphere.” The report pitched the Peace Corps as
an indispensable program for the friendship of Latin America and a vital part of the
Alliance for Progress.204 It boasted that it was “helping to undermine old, stereotyped
images of the United States” and that “not one volunteer has been declared incompetent
or objectionable by any nation anywhere.”205 The report also included the support of
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who thought the agency was providing a valuable service
204
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by aiding democratic development in Latin America and called for a doubling of
volunteers in the region.206
Touting the success and support of its work, the Peace Corps printed encouraging
words like the following excerpt from a Minister of Development in Latin America:
“When the Peace Corps came to my country, they brought a breath of fresh air. They
came and they mixed with the people. They worked closely with the people. They were
carpenters, skilled tradesmen, craftsmen, etc. They closed the gap and crashed the
barrier. And because they did this, they have paved the way for our own people to
understand that this is a relationship which is acceptable.”207
The 1963 report also presented one of the most honest and critical assessments of
the failures of the young agency. According to the report,
The volunteers blame many things on Peace Corps headquarters in
Washington, especially the difficulties that often arise during their first year
overseas. These ‘first-year’ experiences contain many of our problems, including
sobering stories of failure. There were failures of programming and planning, of
training and administration. Some of these were the inevitable mistakes of an
organization that responded with a sense of urgency to far-flung needs. Others,
our own hindsight and that of our critics, tell us, were avoidable.
Some of our projects have been distinguished more by good intentions
than good works. There have been instances where we trained Volunteers for a
particular job that failed to materialize. In Bolivia, we assigned nurses to work
with a public health agency that began disbanding shortly after our arrival.
There have been staff members, Volunteers and host country co-workers
who were not quite up to the task. We have ‘fired’ staff members, terminated
Volunteers, and asked that co-workers be changed.208
Mistakes were also made in training volunteers in the wrong language. The agency
believed that by facing its disappointments and failures it would grow and understand
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itself.209 One can applaud the agency for its honesty, but it seems the authors overlooked
the apparent contradiction when the same report boasted that no volunteer had been
deemed incompetent.210
The reports to Congress for 1964 and 1965 continued to flaunt successes but with
little critical self examination. The few words explaining disappointments concerned the
slow progress of community development work in Colombia, something volunteers of
this study often commented on but which the Peace Corps felt little need to advertise in
great detail. Instead, the agency described volunteers as “a source of strength and
inspiration for” host countries and “a symbol of what is best in the United States.”211 A
project history of Colombia cited good relations and a burgeoning respect for volunteers
from the thousands of Colombians with whom they interacted.212 Furthermore,
volunteers’ work in Colombia was drawing notice from Communists.213 It appeared the
agency was making strides to deter violent revolution and promote democracy as
“conscious instruments of change,” for, as the report claimed, “Latin America’s social
revolution, though sometimes deceptively quiet, is unmistakably real and unmistakably
profound.”214 Colombia was presented as the perfect example of the effectiveness of
volunteers working with Colombia’s community development agency.215
Overall, Peace Corps reports to Congress painted a rosy picture of an agency and
volunteers who, despite some minor setbacks, were making great strides in their work.
Examples were given of success, such as educational television programming in
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Colombia or introducing new math into Filipino schools. Volunteers were succeeding in
their efforts to change people and provide hope where hope had not existed. Problems
were being solved and world peace furthered, the Peace Corps reported, at the hands of
dedicated people.216
The Peace Corps in Congressional Hearings
Under direct questioning from Congress the Peace Corps maintained its value but
did so while confronting issues of concern to Congressmen. In a 1963 appropriations
hearing Sargent Shriver pointed to press reports and first hand accounts from
Congressmen to demonstrate Peace Corps success.217 In a Senate hearing the following
year Shriver boasted of the agency’s ability to reduce staff and shed over $1000 off the
yearly cost of a volunteer. He presented a letter from Secretary of State Dean Rusk that
supported the budget request and called the agency an “unqualified success.”218 The
accomplishments described during the hearings were similar to what the volunteers in
Colombia recounted. In a 1965 hearing on Peace Corps activities in Latin America,
volunteers were said to be making a positive impact on schools in the region and were
able to boost local economies with co-ops in Peru, Ecuador and Colombia.219 Using
Brazil as an example, Patrick Healy, Deputy Director of the Peace Corps in 1968, called
attention to co-ops formed or expanded, school lunch programs developed, and growing
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awareness among people of what they could do.220
As Congressmen asked the Peace Corps tough questions, a more complete look at
some of the difficulties unfolded. One issue that was resolved was the discontinuity
problem of volunteers leaving before their replacements arrived. This was addressed and
solved by extending tours from twenty four months to twenty seven, thus eliminating the
gap in service time. Shriver found himself under fire about spending and a comment
from a volunteer in Thailand that described his job as not that arduous. “I feel that I am
doing some useful work here,” the volunteer declared, “but at the same time I’m enjoying
myself thoroughly.” Shriver defended the volunteer and noted that the Peace Corps had
also published the comment in its report to Congress, demonstrating that the agency was
not “running a propaganda mill.”221
One of the more candid explanations of Peace Corps problems appeared in a 1968
hearing on U.S. aid operations in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress. Healy
admitted the lack of success in health programs in Brazil. This, however, was a result of
Brazilian organizations inability to supply medicines and skilled help, thus leaving the
volunteer unable to do anything productive.222 A more serious issue was revealed when a
post audit of agricultural work showed there was little need for the program.223
Furthermore, the Brazilian federal government showed little interest in the agency,
relegating operations to the states.224
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By the end of the 1960s the Peace Corps was spending less time flaunting its
achievements in its reports and hearings with Congress. In his introduction to Congress
in the annual report for the fiscal year 1970, Director Joseph H. Blatchford stated that
rather than attempt to justify their work he would simply set out the facts and figures that
underlined their request for funds.225 A similar approach can be seen in an August 1970
hearing before the Senate. Only one page was delegated to the programs that were in
place, though there was discussion concerning changes of course and glitches in the
agency. In reference to the history of community development work in Colombia, Acting
Director Thomas J. Houser recounted the lack of support in the early years that
volunteers received outside the community in which they worked. “For many of the
volunteers” said Hauser, “this lack of structure proved untenable and many of them went
home prematurely.” In turn, projects became more defined and integrated with
Colombian resources.226
Hauser and the Senators also discussed the cut in the number of volunteers, the
drop off in host country requests and how, for one reason or another, the agency lost
about 20 percent of the volunteers within the first year. Very few, however, were said to
be terminated. He admitted that at times the ineffectiveness of volunteers was the fault of
the agency. On a more positive note, about 20 percent of those who completed their
service extended it or re-enrolled for another complete tour.227
When asked about volunteer safety, Hauser’s response mirrored that of the
volunteers. He asserted the safety of the environment in which volunteers lived and
225

Peace Corps Congressional Presentation Fiscal Year 1970, May 1969, Introduction.
Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1971: Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations, 91st Cong., 2nd
sess., 25 August 1970, 83.
227
Ibid., 90.
226

65

worked, although “that is not to say in a couple of instances a few of our volunteers have
not been abused.”228 This coincides with the accounts of volunteers, but Hauser does not
refer to actual incidents.
Another topic of interest in this 1970 hearing was the radicalization of volunteers.
A group of returned volunteers were demonstrating against the Peace Corps because,
according to Houser, the agency “represents an imperialistic attitude of the United States;
that we are not going overseas to help as much as we are to exploit.” Houser dismissed
this radicalism as “patent nonsense” and pointed out that nearly 41,000 volunteers had
returned home over nine years and only about 200 were protesting.229 The radicalization
of volunteers is briefly addressed by a few volunteers in Colombia.
Houser also addressed criticism from current volunteers: “I think the Peace Corps
always finds it is subject to criticism by volunteers in service. We are not always doing
the best job of site selection and programming. Sometimes we learn that the training has
not always been what it should be. I think this is something that the Peace Corps has
sustained over the years. This kind of criticism we accept and hopefully we can learn
from it and go on and do a better job. . . . We criticize ourselves and we look at our
programs and training because we know we can do better.”230 The agency, in response to
volunteer criticism, moved its end of service conferences to the end of the first year to
address such issues.231
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CONCLUSION
In the early 1960s, in the midst of the Cold War, President Kennedy inspired
Americans to serve their country in the interest of the common good. From the seeds of
idealism and cold war fears grew the Peace Corps, quickly fanning out across the globe
under the banner of friendship and service. While the Peace Corps had its detractors,
some in Washington believed it would contribute in the war against communism by
promoting reform, goodwill and understanding in the developing world. The Peace
Corps could lend a helping hand to those in need and boost America’s image abroad,
particularly in non-aligned nations. Latin America became an essential part of
Kennedy’s foreign policy, receiving billions of dollars under the Alliance for Progress
and thousands of Peace Corps volunteers in the 1960s. Colombia, emerging from a
bloody civil war, was a leading partner in this endeavor and a showcase for U.S. policy in
the region. It welcomed U.S. economic and military aid and became the first Latin
American nation to host Peace Corps volunteers.
In addition to providing needed manpower, the Peace Corps strove to promote
cross-cultural understanding among Americans and peoples of the developing world.
This understanding and building of relations, according to the accounts of many of the
volunteers of this study, was one of the most notable results of their service. Participants
tell of Colombians who learned about Americans firsthand, dispelling preconceptions of
who and what an American was. Volunteers were able, in a sense, to humanize the
United States while developing an understanding between them and their Colombian
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friends and associates. For volunteers who downplayed their contributions or lack of
what they perceived as real progress, they could still point to the positive, friendly
relations cultivated from their time abroad.
This study set out to assess the work of volunteers by comparing their accounts
with Peace Corps publications and reports to Congress. Examining these sources reveals
the similarities and discrepancies between volunteers’ accounts and the agency’s reports.
Most of what the Peace Corps reported was presented in glowing terms, but it did not
remain silent on some of the problems volunteers encountered or issues within the
agency. The Peace Corps did not, however, always provide comprehensive accounts of
its failures, usually divulging problems in broad strokes rather than the more specific
complaints or criticisms expressed by volunteers. Whether the agency should bear
criticism for this is up for debate, but the annual reports and presentations to Congress
were not purely propaganda to further its agenda.
Peace Corps reports and presentations to Congress presented aspects of the Peace
Corps experience also heard in the voices of the volunteers in Colombia. Problems and
frustrations were presented, such as lack of progress, insufficient support for volunteers
or inadequacies in training. The agency reported on the barriers created by volunteer
deficiencies in the host country language and sought to remedy them. The reports and the
volunteers of this study told of strong, meaningful and lasting relationships. These
relationships, as exhibited by the agency and the volunteers, transcended politics and
governments, broke down stereotypes and advanced understanding on a basic human
level.
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Whether oblivious to their existence or just unwilling to address them publicly,
there were topics in which the Peace Corps did not provide an outlet for volunteers’
sentiments. Several volunteers bemoaned the resistance to change of some Colombians
in power and even the Peace Corps itself. At times the Catholic Church and the National
Coffee Federation were accused of derailing work that empowered communities,
clutching to a paternalistic social system. Volunteers commented on a lack of resources
and funding and apathy among Colombians. Although the Peace Corps presented some
stumbling blocks and failures, these types of stories are not evident in the publications.
In 1966 the Peace Corps reached its peak in numbers with 15,556 volunteers and
trainees in field. The $114 million budget that year would be the highest until 1984
which provided for only 5,699 volunteers and trainees.232 The agency reached a low of
5,219 volunteers and trainees under Reagan in 1987 at a cost of nearly $138 million.
Jumping ahead twenty years, for the fiscal year 2007 the Peace Corps had just over 8,000
volunteers–slightly over half the peak in 1966–with a budget of $319.7 million.233
Considering the total federal budget, the cost of the Peace Corps is minuscule. U.S.
military expenditures alone for the fiscal year 2008 are $623 billion.234
Today the Cold War is but a memory, supplanted by the global war on terror.
America once again finds itself embroiled in a nontraditional war without borders or
standing armies, deeply rooted in ideology. Meanwhile, America’s image abroad has
reached historical lows. In a 2006 study conducted in twenty-six nations by the Program
on International Policy Attitudes and GlobeScan, 51 percent of those polled said the
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United States is having a mostly negative influence in the world, the highest number ever
recorded. According to State Department data and the recent Pew data, those numbers
are part of a greater trend. Since 1999, favorable views of the United States around the
world have dropped considerably. In the Muslim countries of Morocco, Indonesia and
Turkey, favorable views have declined from 77 percent to 49 percent, 75 to 30 percent,
and 62 to 12 percent respectively.235
During Congressional testimony in early 2007, Dr. Steven Kull, Director,
Program on International Policy Attitudes and editor of WorldPublicOpinon.org, said
there is strong evidence that the “unhappiness with the US is not a rejection of US
values.” The United States, it appears, is held to a higher standard by much of the world.
“The problem,” claimed Kull, “is that of late there has been a growing perception that the
US is not living up to its principles.”236
In a December 2003 policy brief for the Brookings Institution, Lex Rieffel
advocates an expansion of the Peace Corps. The Peace Corps, contends Rieffel, is
embraced by developing nations and one of the least expensive methods used to advance
U.S. foreign policy objectives. And in regard to the Peace Corps goal of promoting
understanding of Americans, Rieffel believes “personal relationships have always been
the best way to promote American ideals. Fostering these relationships has been the
greatest success of the Peace Corps” and “making friends appears to have even greater
urgency today than forty years ago.”237 Congressman Farr concurs, calling on a tripling
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of funding for the agency to place 20,000 volunteers, for it is “one of the best ways to
improve international understanding.” The Peace Corps, asserts Farr, provides an
“experience with another culture” that “is key to the peaceful world we’re all seeking. . .
.”238 These views are consistent with those of the volunteers of this study.
In 1961 the Peace Corps set out to make friends and foster understanding among
Americans and the developing world. And while still pertinent today, evidence indicates
that from the perspective of volunteers in Colombia in the 1960s, they established strong
relationships, made friends, and promoted the positive qualities of the United States.
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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRES
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The former Peace Corps volunteers who took part in this study completed a
questionnaire regarding their work and experiences in Colombia. There were two
versions that were distributed and are presented below.
QUESTIONNAIRE ONE
YOUR NAME
DATE
1. When did you serve in the Peace Corps?
2. What were your motivations to join the Peace Corps?
3. What type of training did you undergo? Where did this take place? Were you trained
in community development and if so, what did this entail?
4. What did you hope to accomplish when you set out for Colombia?
5. Where did you live and work while in Colombia (municipio and vereda)?
6. What sort of community did you work in and who decided this? Do you know what
the process was that determined where and for whom you worked?
7. What party organizations were active in the town?
8. How would you describe your relationships with community leaders?
9. Did you ever feel or sense hostility from Colombians? Did you feel welcomed and
supported?
10. What projects did you work on? Who provided funding for them? Did you have any
input on what projects you worked on?
11. How would you describe the social/economic conditions of the community when you
first arrived (health, education, nourishment)?
12. What community organizations were already present when you arrived?
13. What did you see as the main problems for development?
14. What was the political situation in the community?
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15. Did you witness any political mobilization or involvement with guerrilla groups? If
so, please explain.
16. What were the social activities of the Catholic Church in the town?
17. Were you familiar with Liberation theology at the time? If so, please explain.
18. Did you ever see any subversive literature around the community? If so, please
explain.
19. Was there any subversive activity that you were aware of in or near your community?
If so, do you know what it was due to?
20. Did you ever work with representatives of CARE? If so please explain.
21. Did you ever hear about ANUC or its activities?
22. If so, did you ever work or were you affiliated with the peasant organization ANUC?
23. Did you ever work or have contact with people who were involved with ANUC?
24. Did you ever witness or participate in any demonstrations or protests? If so, please
explain providing date and location.
25. Were you ever involved with Colombia’s land reform movement? If so please
explain.
26. Did you ever work with INCORA? If so please explain.
27. Did you ever participate in any way with land seizures (giving advice, direct action,
or support)?
28. What do you feel was accomplished by your work in Colombia?
QUESTIONNAIRE TWO
YOUR NAME
DATE
1. When did you serve in the Peace Corps?
2. What were your motivations to join the Peace Corps?
3. What type of training did you undergo? Where did this take place? Were you trained
in community development and if so, what did this entail?
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4. What did you hope to accomplish in Colombia?
5. Where did you live and work while in Colombia (municipio and vereda)?
6. What sort of community did you work in and do you know the process that determined
where and for whom you worked?
7. How would you describe your relationships with community leaders? With the people
in your community?
8. What projects did you work on? Who provided funding for them? Did you have any
input on what projects you worked on?
9. How would you describe the social/economic conditions of the community when you
first arrived (health, education, nourishment)?
10. What community organizations were already present when you arrived?
.
11. What was the political situation in the community?
12. Did you witness any political mobilization or guerrilla activity? If so, please explain.
13. What was the role of the Catholic Church where you lived?
14. Was there any politically sensitive literature around the community? If so, please
explain.
15. Did you ever witness any demonstrations or protests? If so, please explain providing
date and location.
16. Did you ever work with Colombia’s land reform movement? If so, please explain.
17. Did you ever work on projects with INCORA or the peasant organization ANUC? If
so, please explain.
18. What did you see as the main problems for development?
19. What obstacles did you face in your job?
20. How was your work in Colombia different from that which you were trained?
21. What impact do you think you had by living and working in Colombia?
22. In detail, would you explain what you believe to be the successes and failures of your
work in Colombia?
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23. How do you think your work differed from your expectations and the expectations of
the Peace Corps and the U.S. government?
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